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ABSTRACT 
 
The objective of this paper is to examine the corporate dividend policy for the Greek market. In a 
series of studies, concerning the Greek market, Vasiliou & Eriotis test and improve, using a panel 
of data, the classical study of John Lintner who explains the amount dividend paid by firms using 
the earnings of the firm plus an adjustment according to the dividend paid the year before. This 
paper is an extension of Vasiliou & Eriotis’ work that test the assumption that firms set their 
dividend policy not only by the net distributed earnings, but also by the change from the last 
year’s dividend, the change from the last year’s distributed earnings and the size of the firm. This 
model is applied on a panel sample of a large number of firms listed on the Athens Stock 
Exchange for the period 1996 – 2001.  The hypothesis that is tested in this paper is that the 
dividend at time t depends upon the distributed earnings at time t, the size of the firm and changes 
in dividend and distributed earnings from the last year (t-1). The empirical results verified the 
hypothesis that the Greek companies prefer to distribute, each year a rather constant dividend, 
which they adjust from year to year according to their distributed earnings and size. 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
uring the last years a series of studies concerning the dividend policy in the Greek market have been 
performed. The motivation for these studies is the international extensive researches about factors 
that might be important in determining firm’s dividend policy.  There are many reasons explaining 
why dividend policy is so interesting. One reason is that the dividend policy of the firm affects its capital structure, 
since the retained earnings intent to fund the firm. Otherwise, the firm has to raise funds by issuing new debt. 
Consider the case where the dividend payment is increased, then fewer funds are available internally for financing 
investments and consequently additional equity capital is needed, thus the company has to issue new common stock. 
In the real world, firms choose to raise funds instead of retain bigger portion of their earnings. Another reason is that 
a company’s dividend decision may change the value of its stock. 
 
During the last fifty years, a series of empirical and theoretical works have been conducted. Summarizing 
all these works, there are three dominating views. The first one suggests that an increase in dividend payout affects 
positively the market value of the firm
1
. The second argues that a positive change in the dividend decreases the 
firm’s value2. Finally, the third one claims that dividend policy does not affect the market value of the firm3.  
However, the empirical evidence on the determinants of corporate dividend policy is, unfortunately, very mixed
4
. 
 
This paper continues the analysis of dividend policy for the Greek market and tests the effect of the size of 
the firm and the changes in its distributed earnings. The empirical investigation is performed in a panel of data from 
                                                 
1
 See Gordon (1963), and Lintner (1962). 
2
 See Lintzenberger and Ramaswamy (1979). 
3
 See Miller and Modigliani (1961). 
4
 For more information see Frankfurter and Wood, Jr. (2002), Allen and Michaely (1995), Barclay, Smith and Watts 
(1995), and Short, Zhang, and Keasey (2002). 
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a sample of the companies listed in the Greek stock market during the period 1996 - 2001.  This paper is organized 
as follows. Section 2 describes briefly the empirical models that explain how corporate managers decide on dividend 
payments and presents the main findings of the relevant literature. Section 3 discusses the data and the variables 
employed in the analysis.  Section 4 reports the model that is designed to provide a basis for assessing the relevant 
importance of the various factors explaining the corporate dividend policy.  Section 5 provides the results of the 
empirical analysis.  Finally, section 6 presents the conclusions. 
 
MODELS OF DIVIDEND POLICY 
 
In a characteristic study, John Lintner (1956) conducted a series of interviews with corporate managers 
about dividend policies of their companies. The total number of companies that he used was 600 from which he 
finally has chosen only 28, to survey and interview. In his study, Lintner made a number of important observations 
concerning the dividend policies of these companies. One of the most important conclusions is that companies have 
a long-run target dividend payout ratio. That meant that companies aim to distribute, in the long run, a constant 
portion of their earnings each year. Another interesting remark of Lintner’s study concerns the managers that proved 
to be more interested on changes on dividend than on absolute levels. Additionally, managers avoid changing their 
dividend policy if they were not certain that they will be able to keep the new policy constant for a reasonable 
period. That is to say that managers avoid changing the companies’ dividend policy very often since it is likely to 
give a negative signal to investors as uncertainty increases. 
 
In his empirical analysis, Lintner developed a partial adjustment model that captures the above findings. 
According to Lintner, each firm i has a target dividend payout ratio (ri). Using this payout ratio, Lintner, computed 
the target dividend at time t (Dit
*
) as a proportion of the real earnings of the firm i at time t (Eit), i.e. Dit
*
= ri Eit. In 
real world the dividend, which the firm finally pays, at time t, (Dit) differs from the target one (Dit
*
). Thus, it is more 
reasonable to model the change between the actual dividend at time t and time t-1, instead of the actual dividend at 
time t only. Taking the change in actual dividends into account, it is realistic and consistent with the long-run target 
payout ratio, to assume that the actual change in dividend at time t, (Dit - Di,t-1), equals to a constant portion (αi) plus 
the speed with which the dividend, at time t-1, has adjusted to the target dividend at time t, (Dit
*
 - Di,t-1). Since the 
target dividend at time t is a proportion of the real earnings at time t, the final model is as follows: 
 
, 1 , 1it i t i i i it i i tD D a c rE c D      (1) 
 
where Dit = the actual dividend payment during period t, Eit = the earnings of the firm during period t, ci = the 
adjustment factor (which indicates the speed with which the dividend, at time t-1, has adjusted to the optimal target 
dividend at time t), and ri = the target payout ratio. This theoretical model can be estimated using the following 
econometric model: 
 
1 2 , 1it i it i t itD a E D        (2) 
 
where ΔDit = the change in dividend from time t-1 to time t, for the firm i, β1 represents the product ci times ri of  the 
theoretical model, β2 = the variable ci of the theoretical model with negative sign (that is, β2 = - ci), and εit = the error 
of the model
5. Lintner’s estimation of the above model appeared fairly good, explaining 85% of the dividend 
changes in his sample of companies.   
 
Fama and Babiak (1968) undertook a more comprehensive study of Lintner model’s performance.  Their 
starting point was the work of Lintner (1956). Their sample consists of 392 industrial firms over the period 1946 
through 1964. Fama and Babiak tested the Lintner’s model with their data and methodology and found that it 
performed well but it can be improved by introducing, as an additional explanatory variable, the earnings from the 
previous year without the constant term.  An alternative behavioral justification often used in the literature to derive 
                                                 
5
 β1 = ci ri      ri = (β1 / ci)      ri = (- β1 / β2). 
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equation (2) is the adaptive expectations model
6
.  This model assumes that the dividend at time t is given by a 
proportion (κi) of the long-run expected earnings at time t (Eit
*
) plus a disturbance term (vit). 
 
*
it i it itD E v   
 
In addition, the model assumes that the change at t in long-run expected earnings (Eit
*
 - Ei,t-1
*
), can be expressed as a 
proportion (λi) of the change between the actual earnings at time t and the expected long-run earnings at time t-1 (Eit 
- Ei,t-1
*
); that is,  
 
 * * *, 1 , 1it i t i it i tE E E E     
 
But if the successive earning changes are independent, the optimal value of λi is one (full adjustment). Thus, the 
final theoretical model suggests that the change in dividend (Dit - Di,t-1) is equal to a constant portion (αi) plus the 
proportion (κi) of the actual earnings (Eit) minus λi times the dividend at time t-1 (note that the optimal λ is one): 
 
, 1 , 1it i t i i it i t itD D a E D v       
 
However, Fama and Babiak (1968) claim that their estimations suggest that the adaptive expectations appears to be 
an inappropriate specification to their sample.  
 
As far as the dividend policy in the Greek market is concerned, there is a number of papers testing 
alternative dividend policy models.  Patsouratis (1989) investigated empirically the Greek corporate dividend 
behavior employing analysis of covariance.  The basis of this research is the classic work of Brittain (1964).  His 
sample consists of 25 firms and covers the period 1974 – 1983. Next, Joannos and Filippas (1997) examined the 
dividend policy of 34 firms listed in the Athens Stock Exchange during the period 1972 – 1988. Their empirical 
results lead to the general conclusion that Lintner’s model best describes the dividend policy of the Greek firms.  
Current profits constitute the most important variable that tends to influence the change in dividends while the 
previous period dividends tend to also significantly influence the change in the dividend policy of the firms. 
 
This paper is based on the work of Vasiliou & Eriotis (2003) and Eriotis & Vasiliou (2003). Vasiliou and 
Eriotis (2003) test the model of Lintner and suggest two different versions that improve the original model 
introduced by Lintner. In their first version of the Lintner’s model, they consider as dependent variable the change in 
dividend between time t and time t-1 and as independent variables the change in the earnings of the firm between 
time t and t-1 and the change in dividend between time t-1 and t-2: 
 
 1 2 , 1 3it i it i t itD a E D          
 
where Dit is the dividend of the firm i at time t, Eit is the net income of the firm i available to stockholders at time t, 
ΔDit (= Dit - Di,t-1) is the change between the dividend at time t and time t-1, for the firm i, ΔEit (= Eit - Ei,t-1) the 
change in the net income available to stockholders, at time t and time t-1, and εit is the error at time t. 
The next empirical model that they test considers the same variables, dependent and independent, but this time 
without the changes between time t and t-1: 
 
 1 2 , 1 4it i it i t itD a E D       
 
The findings of Vasiliou and Eriotis (2003) suggest that the Greek firms follow a discrete dividend policy. 
That is, the dividend payout of a firm depends upon the firm’s long-run target dividend that is adjusted according to 
the net earnings of the firm. 
                                                 
6
  For a discussion, see Brittain (1966), pp. 27-31. 
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Eriotis and Vasiliou (2003) followed the similar process and analyze the effect of sales in a model like the 
one presented in equation 4. Their results support that firms adjust their dividend according to their earnings and 
they are not willing to change their dividend policy in the short – run. Additionally, the introduction of sales in the 
empirical analysis improve the estimations and provide an indication that successful sales of a firm can improve the 
amount of distributed dividend. 
 
 This paper examines the explanatory power of distributed earnings and size of the firm. According to this 
hypothesis, the decision to distribute dividend is more proper to be explained not by the earnings of the firm but with 
the combination of current distributed earnings and size of firm. The size of firm is represented by the current sales 
of the firm and includes both the risk of company and the related bankruptcy cost
7
. Large companies are more 
independent and less risky than small firms, which make them more attractive to investors. Additionally, the 
management team of large companies is more willing to pay higher dividends, than smaller firms. In order to test the 
previous result of Vasiliou and Eriotis for the Greek market (that Greek firms have a long run target dividend payout 
ratio) two variables are included. The first one is the changes in dividend between year t and t-1 and the second one 
is the changes in distributed earnings between year t and t-1. 
 
DATA AND VARIABLES 
 
The empirical investigation conducted for a large sample of the companies listed in the Athens Stock 
Exchange market during the period 1996 – 2001. For a firm to be included in the sample, two criteria had to be met.  
First, the firm had to be listed in the Stock Exchange market for the whole of the period under consideration.  
Second, the firm would be required to be listed in the year 1995.  This condition was imposed to ensure that 
dividend policy was not distorted by the effects of a recent official listing.  The final sample consists of 149 firms in 
a 5 year period; that is, a panel of data with 718 observations, since some data were missing. 
 
In order to examine empirically the dividend models discussed in the previous section, the key variables of 
interest are the: measures of dividends (D), distributed earnings (DE), sales (S) and changes in this year’s distributed 
earnings and dividend from this year to the year before (ΔDE and ΔD). These variables were derived from data 
collected from the financial database of the Athens Stock Exchange.  Dividends (Di,t) are calculated as the total 
amount of dividends of the firm i at time t, distributed earnings (DEi,t) as the distributed earnings of the firm i at time 
t, size (Si,t) as the total sales of the company, changes in the distributed earnings (ΔDEi,t) as DEi,t - DEi,t-1 and in last 
year’s dividend (ΔDt) as ΔDt - ΔDt-1. 
 
THE MODEL 
 
 In order to proceed the analysis of the data econometric methods designed for panel data were used. The 
use of panel data models is a powerful research instrument, since it combines the cross-sectional data with time-
series data, and provides results that could not be estimated and studied if only time-series or cross-section data were 
used. A general model for panel data that allows the researcher to estimate panel data with great flexibility and 
formulate the differences in the behavior of the cross-section elements is theoretically as follows
8
: 
 
it it it ity x z a      
 
where yit = is the dependent variable, xi = is the matrix with the independent variables, and zi = is a matrix which 
contains a constant term and a set of individual or group specific variables, which may be observed or unobserved.  
This model is a classical regression model. If the matrix zi can be observed, for all individuals, then the least square 
method gives efficient and consistent estimators.  
 
The pooled regression considers that zi contains only a constant term. In this case the ordinary least square 
method provides an efficient and consistent estimate for the β and the α coefficients. If zi is unobserved and 
                                                 
7
 see M. Bennett and R. Donnelly (1993) 
8
 For more information see Greene (2003). 
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correlated with the independent variables then the least squares estimator of β is biased and inconsistent, as a 
consequence of an omitted variable. The fixed effects method takes those problems into account and gives an 
unbiased and consistent estimator of β and α. If the unobserved individual effects can be formulated, and under the 
assumption that these observations are uncorrelated with the independent variables, the econometric model can be 
estimated by the random effects method. 
 
This paper tests the explanatory power of a model based on the distributed earnings of the firm and its size 
and examines a previous result for the Greek market, that firms have a long run target payout ratio, not only by the 
known changes in dividend parameter but also by the changes in distributed earnings. The econometric presentation 
of the model is: 
 
1 2 3 , 4it i it it i t it itD a DE S D DE             (5) 
 
where Dit = the dividend of the firm i at time t, DEit = the distributed earnings of the firm i at time t, ΔDit = Dit – Di,t-1 
the change between the dividend at time t and time t-1, for the firm i, ΔDEit = DEit – DEi,t-1 the change between the 
distributed earnings at time t and time t-1, for the firm i and εit = the error at time t. 
 
EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
Tables 1 to 3 present the estimations of the econometric model presented in equation 5. In order to run and 
improve the performance of the models they were estimated by using the total, the fixed effects and the random 
effects model. In contrast with previews analyses in dividend policy for the Greek market the random effects model 
provide us with high R
2
 and all the independent variables were found to be significant except for the constant term 
that was not significant even for 90% level of confidence. The insignificance of the constant term raises a point 
against the use of the constant term in the model. In order to test this finding the total model was estimated with and 
without the constant term. The estimates from the fixed effects model proved to be more appropriate. 
 
The results from the Random Effects model are presented in the Table 1.  
 
 
Table 1 
Model 
1 2 3 , 4it i it it i t it itD a DE S D DE             
Method Random Effects (GLS, Variance Components) 
 Coefficients t – Stat. Prob. (t – Stat.) Stand. Error 
Constant -837,882.3 -1.053 0.292 795,953.4 
DEt 0.197 18.500 0.000 0.011 
St 0.043 19.601 0.000 0.022 
ΔDt -0.551 -7.846 0.000 0.031 
ΔDEt -0.134 -11.917 0.000 0.011 
R
2
 0.946 
R
2
 adj. 0.946 
S.E. 8,108.559 
GLS: Generalized Least Square 
S.E. is the square error of the regression. 
 
 
The results with the random effects total model indicate that the 94.6% of the amount of dividend paid by 
the firm can be explained by the variables tested. It is obvious that the constant term is not statistically significant. 
On the contrary all the independent variables proved to be very useful and to have very high t – statistics, which 
indicate that are statistically significant in level of confidence 95%. 
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The same econometric model was estimated with the Total model and it is presented in Table 2. Table 2 
presents the estimation of the model 5 without the constant term. The constant term was omitted because the results 
of the regression were better than those obtained when the constant term was included. In more detail the R
2
 – 
adjusted and the F– statistic of the model were 78.7% and 657.6 respectively. 
 
 
Table 2 
Model 
1 2 3 , 4it it it i t it itD DE S D DE            
Method Total (GLS, cross section weights) 
 Coefficients t – Stat. Prob. (t – Stat.) Stand. Error 
DEt 0.202 38.356 0.000 0.005 
St 0.032 79.159 0.000 0.000 
ΔDt -0.442 -15.212 0.000 0.029 
ΔDEt -0.137 -14.983 0.000 0.009 
R
2
 0.831 
R
2
 adj. 0.831 
F – Stat. 1,173.8 
S.E. 13,913,989 
GLS: Generalized Least Square 
S.E. is the square error of the regression. 
 
 
The results of the total model did not improve our first estimation. The R
2
 is now lower and the square error 
of the regression is bigger than that of random effects model presented in Table 1. The most important results are 
that all the explanatory variable are significant in 95% and the R
2
 without the constant term is 5% greater than the 
one with the constant term. Comparing the results presented in Tables 1 and 2 we see that the random effects model 
has a greater explanatory power but with the constant term insignificant. There are many possible reasons for this, 
the most probable one is that there are individual effects in the panel data. At this point, the set of the assumption of 
the random effects model was relaxed (i.e. that the individual or group effects are known and can be formulated) and 
the model was estimated by the Fixed Effects model. The results are presented in Table 3. 
 
Table 3 
Model 
1 2 3 , 4it it it i t it itD DE S D DE            
Method Fixed Effects (GLS, cross section weights) 
 Coefficients t – Stat. Prob. (t – Stat.) Stand. Error 
DEt 0.182 22.268 0.000 0.008 
St 0.034 30.707 0.000 0.001 
ΔDt -0.478 -24.174 0.000 0.019 
ΔDEt -0.116 -18.949 0.000 0.006 
R
2
 0.961 
R
2
 adj. 0.951 
F – Stat. 4,687.2 
S.E. 7,367,659 
GLS: Generalized Least Square 
S.E. is the square error of the regression. 
 
 
The estimation of the econometric model by the fixed effects method improved our results. The 
explanatory power of the fixed effects model increased to 95.1% (R
2
 – adjusted) and the F – Statistic appears even 
better. In addition, all the coefficients are statistically significant in level of confidence 95%. 
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The results from the three econometric models (i.e. total, random and fixed effects models) provide us with 
very important remarks. All the independent variables are statistically significant and their signs remain unchanged 
for all the estimated models. As it was expected, the distributed earnings of the firm are positively related with the 
dividend of the firm. The greater amount from the earnings that are going to be distributed the greater the dividend. 
In the case where the earnings of the firm are lower than the last years earnings, the firm will adjust the dividend 
accordingly. The positive sign in the size variable expresses the trend of bigger and stronger firms to distribute 
higher dividend than the small ones. That makes sense since powerful and big companies have better access in the 
market and can raise funds easier than smaller companies, thus they can allocate more money to their investors. 
 
Concerning the variables that test the long run target dividend payout ratio two major observations have to 
be made, both variables are statistically significant with negative signs. As far as the changes from last year’s 
dividend is concerned, the negative sign indicates that the firm has a constant payout ratio. Considering an increase 
from the last year’s dividend, the increase will have negative impact on this year’s dividend; this deduction 
constitutes the will of the firm to not change its dividend policy and to obtain the same dividend payout ratio. This 
result is consistent with the findings of Lintner (1956) that managers do not change the firm’s payout policy in the 
short run. The second evidence that supports Lintner’s findings is the negative sign in the variable that measures the 
changes in the distributed earnings of the firm. A positive change in distributed earnings has a negative impact on 
the distributed dividend. This result straightens the previous conclusion that even thought firms are increasing their 
earnings they try not to change their dividend policy, at least for the short – run. 
 
The above findings are consistent with the previous works of Vasiliou & Eriotis conducted for the Greek 
market during the same period. Both results support the existence of target long – run payout ratio and that dividend 
in year t depends on distributed earning and size of the firm plus an adjustment from the last year’s dividend and 
distributed earnings of the firm. 
 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
The empirical findings of the model presented in this paper suggest that distributed earnings and size of 
firm include an indication about the firm’s dividend.  This model also tested previous results of the Greek market 
that Greek firms have a long run target dividend payout ratio.  The model includes two variables that determine the 
corporate dividend decisions, the distributed earnings and the size of the firm. The results of this model provide a 
significant estimation with explanatory power of 95,4% (when cross section weights and characteristic groups are 
taken into account). This model’s evidence suggests that the dividend at time t can be expressed as the long-run 
target dividend payout represented by both the changes in dividend and in distributed earnings and an adjustment to 
distributed earnings and last year’s dividend of the firm at time t.  Thus, on the evidence so far available, it appears 
that the Greek sample companies have a general dividend policy: to distribute, each year, dividend according their 
target payout ratio, which is adjusted to distributed earnings and size of the firm. 
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